

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.125
26 April 1963
ENGLISH

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

AUG 13 1963

DOCUMENT
COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FIFTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday, 26 April, 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Lij Mikael IMRU

(Ethiopia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J. de CASTRO
Mr. J. MACHADO LOPES
Mr. E. HOSANNAH
Mr. S. PORTELLA de AGUIAR

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV
Mr. V. IZMIRLIEV
Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. S.F. RAE
Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA
Mr. V. PECHOTA
Mr. V. VAJNAR
Mr. A. MIKULIN

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU
Ato M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A.S. LALI
Mr. A.S. MEHTA
Mr. S.D. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI
Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI
Mr. P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. M.T. MBU

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Mr. O. NEDA

Sweden:

Baron C.H. von PLATEN

Mr. S. LÖFGREN

Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN

Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV

Mr. U.B. ANTIASOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN

Mr. S. AHMED

Mr. M. KASSIM

Mr. S.F. IBRAHIM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON

Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN

Mr. J.M. EDES

Mr. R.C. BERTHAM

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLIE

Mr. A.L. RICHARDS

Mr. D.E. MARK

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Secretariat:

Mr. H.A. CORNIL

The CHAIRMAN (Ethiopia): I declare open the one hundred and twenty-fifth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy)(translation from French): Although our meeting is to deal with the study of collateral disarmament measures, we cannot today ignore the recent news from Moscow. The day before yesterday the United States and United Kingdom ambassadors in Moscow saw Chairman Khrushchev to give him a message from President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan. We know that the message and the subsequent conversation concerned the prohibition of nuclear tests, and that this joint high-level Anglo-American approach is intended to put new life in our negotiations.

The Italian Government wishes to express its satisfaction at the Western nuclear Powers' initiative, which it hopes will bear early fruit. We do not yet know the Soviet Union's response to this fresh goodwill effort by the Western Powers; but I would hope that it will not remain indifferent to a request for a constructive resumption of our discussions, and that the Head of the Soviet Government, Chairman Khrushchev, will form a true appreciation of an approach so obviously in keeping with the feelings of the great majority of the members of this Committee.

Several delegations, including the Italian delegation, have recently expressed in the Committee their concern about the slowness of, and the serious obstacles to, our negotiations, together with their hope that the deadlock could be broken as soon as possible. For instance, on 1 April the Italian delegation, convinced that "... agreement is possible, and that a last and decisive effort must be made to attain it" (ENDC/PV.116, p.30), requested the nuclear Powers to review our progress to date, also with an eye to possible new proposals and further efforts.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

At the same meeting my delegation also emphasized the wish of many of our colleagues, especially the representatives of the non-aligned countries, to put more life in the negotiations by lifting them out of the rut in which they had stuck. The Western Powers have now hearkened to these appeals. That is why, I think, the new approach by the United States and the United Kingdom Governments, which re-confirms the West's firm intention to seek agreement, should find its echo in this Committee.

We know that the main responsibility for concluding a test ban treaty lies with the nuclear Powers; that is why we have a Nuclear Sub-Committee here. The other delegations here and the whole Conference are nevertheless in duty bound to keep the question of banning tests in the forefront as the most urgent and most important of all present-day problems, and to continue to facilitate and encourage more active and more constructive negotiations.

Now that there are signs of possible improvement, I trust the Committee will share the hope I have already expressed: that the fresh action taken to put our negotiations on the right lines will be really fruitful and conclusive.

Mr. KURKA (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): During the discussion in our Committee of specific measures to lessen international tension and to reduce the threat of a nuclear war, a good many convincing arguments have been advanced in favour of serious and immediate discussion of questions which are ripe for solution. These undoubtedly include the draft declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territory for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75); the draft non-aggression pact between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty (ENDC/77); and the question of creating denuclearized zones (ENDC/C.1/1).

We have already had the opportunity to explain the reasons why we fully and wholeheartedly support these proposals. We have frequently pointed out that the present development in the world, which is characterized by an ever more intensive nuclear armaments race, greatly limits the prospects of maintaining peace. It is therefore necessary to make every effort to put a stop to this dangerous development

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and to avert the fateful risk which it entails. Surely no one will deny that the adoption of really effective measures to ease international tension would have a favourable influence on our negotiations on general and complete disarmament, and would bring nearer the prospect of a world freed from the grim spectre of a nuclear war.

These facts have been mentioned many times already both in our Committee and outside it. We have heard them not only from the lips of the representatives of the socialist and non-aligned States but also from the Western representatives. Much has been said here about the need to get rid of suspicion and about the strengthening of confidence in international relations as a basic prerequisite for the successful implementation of general and complete ~~disarmament~~ and the solution of other outstanding international problems.

It has got to the point that the Western delegations are, I would say, misusing the argument of the lack of trust between States as a pretext for rejecting radical measures to eliminate the ~~danger~~ of a nuclear war at the very beginning of the disarmament process. They force upon us the thesis that the existence of mistrust and suspicion makes such radical measures unwise, unrealistic and even unfeasible. On the other hand, we see that it is precisely the Western Powers which stubbornly go on refusing to eliminate the causes of the present tension and mistrust and, instead, are increasing the sources of suspicion and constant tension by their policy of a feverish nuclear arms race, the implementation of plans to spread nuclear weapons, the continuation of nuclear tests and so on. They depict this policy of a feverish arms race as the inevitable consequence of the mistrust existing between States, when as a result of the lack of an agreement on general and complete disarmament each State is obliged to strengthen its armed forces.

A vicious circle is being artificially created, the purpose of which is to prevent the implementation of any effective disarmament measures ~~whats~~soever. All this is being done under the slogan of maintaining the balance of forces, or rather the "balance of terror"; all this is a dangerous fiction of peace based on an ever more intensive armaments race.

(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

Very significant in this respect is the position adopted by the Western delegations in regard to collateral measures for reducing international tension. The Soviet draft declaration is rejected by them under the pretext that its implementation would result in upsetting the balance of forces between East and West. The draft non-aggression pact between the Warsaw Treaty countries and the NATO countries is rejected under practically the same pretext, if one leaves aside arguments which, I would say, are naive in the extreme. The Western delegations maintain a stubborn silence about the establishment of denuclearized zones, but we do not doubt that here again the same arguments about maintaining the balance of forces would be likely to be heard. The same applies to the maintenance of military bases on foreign territory, the retention of practically unlimited possibilities for waging a nuclear war, and the creation of a NATO nuclear force: the reason given for all these is the need to maintain the balance of forces.

We have already said that we disagree with such an interpretation of international security. Today it is obvious to any sober-minded person that the senseless competition in nuclear armaments is becoming a factor which in itself constitutes a direct threat to international peace and security. In such a situation it is not enough to discuss and adopt measures which by their effect would scarcely touch the fringes of the causes of present-day tension. In our opinion we must aim at such steps as might be expected to bring about a radical improvement in the international atmosphere. That is why the arguments of those Western representatives in the Committee who reject the socialist countries' proposals under the pretext that we must be satisfied even with small advances in the direction of agreement sound completely unconvincing. Such assertions serve only to cover up their reluctance to discuss really effective measures which would be likely to reduce the danger of a nuclear war.

The fact that it really is a question of reluctance on the part of the Western Powers to consider effective, specific measures is shown by the whole course of the negotiations in the Committee. Perhaps the representatives of the Western Powers think that ignoring the questions included in the agenda of the negotiations involves less risk for them than polemics on the subject in the Committee. We realize that it is extremely difficult to produce arguments against such proposals as the draft non-aggression pact between the Warsaw Treaty countries and the NATO countries, but

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it will be even more difficult later to explain their negative position on these proposals to the public of the world, including the public of the Western countries, which welcomes the Soviet draft as a sincere proposal on the part of the socialist countries to live in peace with the States associated in NATO.

For the achievement of the aims pursued by our Conference, these proposals are not only very useful but, given goodwill on the part of the Western Powers, can easily be implemented. We realize that these measures by themselves cannot be considered as a final aim. We regard them as a means of clearing the way to the solution of other broader problems connected with ensuring international peace and security, such as, in particular, the problem of general and complete disarmament.

It has been emphasized many times here that it is precisely in the present-day conditions of a high degree of equipment with nuclear-missile weapons that the risk involved in any armed conflict is greatly increased. Given the present-day situation, the inherent logic of any such conflict would inevitably lead to a general thermonuclear war, in which the States of both military groupings would be involved.

From this point of view particular and increasing importance attaches to the preventive aspects of such measures as would create favourable conditions for the reduction of the danger of war and would slow down the arms race. Hardly anyone could sincerely doubt that, for instance, the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty would be just that important preventive measure which, at the same time, would create the necessary atmosphere of confidence for the solution of other international problems.

In previous statements we have already explained in some detail our point of view on the Soviet draft non-aggression pact. Like other delegations of the socialist States, we have tried to outline for our Western colleagues a complete picture of the political and legal aspects of such a pact. During the discussion the socialist delegations have also convincingly shown that the conclusion of such a pact would in no way affect the balance of forces between the two groupings, it would not limit the sovereignty of the States adhering to them or disturb their legitimate interests.

(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

On the other hand, the adoption of such a pact would offer broad guarantees for universal peace and security. Surely this is sufficient reason why the idea of the pact should receive unanimous support from all those who, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, have undertaken not to use force in their international relations in any manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter.

But the Western Powers do not approach the question from the standpoint of their obligations under the Charter. They evade not only the re-affirmation of their undertakings in regard to non-aggression, but also any discussion of this question. They try to hide their embarrassment at and dislike for the Soviet proposal behind arguments which have nothing to do with the question and in the cogency of which they themselves hardly believe. Such behaviour is surely not in accordance with the method of open and frank negotiation which our Committee should adopt and which the Western delegations themselves so frequently urge in words. Their obvious unwillingness to discuss the draft pact is flatly at variance with the repeated verbal assurances uttered from time to time by the Western representatives in the Committee of their readiness to conduct serious negotiations on disarmament and on specific measures. For example, last Friday Mr. Cavalletti stated at a meeting of the Committee:

"Our discussions are tenacious but relaxed. We are making every effort, at least we on the Western side, to understand others' views while upholding our own, not for the pleasure of arguing but in order to reach agreement." (ENDC/PV.122, pp.11, 12)

Here, it seems, one might ask Mr. Cavalletti to what extent his Western colleagues and he himself are guided by this statement in regard to the draft non-aggression pact.

The delegations of the socialist countries are fully entitled to expect a businesslike and frank discussion of the draft pact. This expectation is based on indications which have been given in the past by prominent representatives of the Western Powers. Thus, for example, in October 1962 the President of the United States of America, Mr. Kennedy, in a letter to the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Mr. Khrushchev, declared himself ready to discuss measures for lessening tension

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between the NATO States and the Warsaw Treaty States. The United States delegation now has an opportunity in our Committee to carry out the promise of the head of its Government, and we hope that the United States delegation will not make the Committee wait too long to hear its position in regard to the draft pact, and that it will make its contribution towards the speedy and successful discussion of a question of undisputed importance.

The draft non-aggression pact submitted by the Soviet delegation is a complete treaty document, the political and legal weight of which will in the present international situation help towards consolidating and strengthening universal peace and security. The undertaking not to resort to force or the threat of force in mutual relations is accompanied by an additional undertaking to resolve by peaceful means and through reciprocal consultation all disputes which may arise, as soon as a situation affecting the interests of both sides and threatening peace and security develops. These two undertakings are inseparably interconnected -- I emphasize this, inseparably interconnected.

In this connexion I should like to say a few words on the idea put forward on 19 April by Mr. Lall, the representative of India, that we should separate the question of consultation from the general problems of the pact (ENDC/PV.122, p.38). Although we value highly our Indian colleague's tireless efforts not to lose sight of any element for a rapprochement which would enable us to overcome the existing difficulties, we nevertheless do not think that the implementation of this idea would yield the hoped-for results or be a happy solution. We think that separate discussion of these two undertakings would deprive both of their meaning and content. The undertaking to settle disputes by peaceful means and the undertaking to avoid the threat or the use of force in international relations are two sides of the same coin. The mutual relationship between both undertakings is already established in modern international law. Thus, for example, the Paris treaty of 1928 and the United Nations Charter, which prohibit wars of aggression and other unlawful uses of force in the relations between States, at the same time make it the duty of States to solve all disputes exclusively by peaceful means.

The conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO States and the Warsaw Treaty States is a measure dictated by the realities of present-day international

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life. Its impact would be seen in a radical improvement of the general international atmosphere and, in particular, in the strengthening of political stability in Europe. As you know, it is through Europe that the line dividing the two opposing groups passes, and on either side of this line a vast war potential has been built up which threatens to destroy everyone and everything in the event of a serious crisis in the relations between the two groups of States. It is primarily the peoples of Europe who are profoundly interested in preventing the fateful risk of the existing tense situation in Europe from turning into a nuclear war which would reduce flourishing countries with a thousand years of culture to lifeless ashes.

For this reason the disdainful attitude adopted by the ruling circles in certain Western European countries to the idea of concluding a pact is all the more deserving of condemnation. It is no secret to us that measures of this kind run counter, in particular, to the plans of Bonn, and that the West German Government is doing its utmost to prevent the assumption of any obligation to the socialist States that would mean renouncing the use of force in mutual relations. Although the Western delegations in our Committee obviously dare not admit that the West German Government is exerting pressure on their Governments in this regard, it is nevertheless clear that one of the main causes of the opposition of the Western Powers to the draft pact has its sources in Bonn. Government circles in the Federal Republic of Germany evaluate the conclusion of a pact as a drastic limitation of the possibilities for carrying out their aggressive plans in regard to their Eastern neighbours.

The advocates of revanchism, of the alteration of the existing political conditions in Europe and the forcible revision of the frontiers established as a result of the Second World War, who determine the policy of the present West German Government, are unceasing in their efforts to frustrate any measures that might lead to the improvement and normalization of the situation in Europe. For this reason the apologetical statements of the Western representatives in our Committee about the "love of peace" and "loyalty" of their West German ally sound all the more absurd.

The other German State --- the German Democratic Republic --- takes a completely different position on this question. Guided by the principles of its peace-loving policy, the Government of the German Democratic Republic actively supports the idea of concluding a non-aggression pact. As you know, in its recent message to the two

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co-Chairmen of our Committee (ENDC/81) this Government itself took the initiative of proposing the conclusion between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany of an agreement on renunciation of the use of force, of all attempts and aspirations to alter the frontiers between the two States, of the testing, manufacturing, acquisition and possession of nuclear weapons, and also of the right to have nuclear weapons at their disposal. Both German States would put an end to the growth of armaments by assuming an obligation not to increase military expenditures. I think there is no need to adduce further facts to prove which of the two German States is striving for solid peace and security in Europe and which one is trying, on the contrary, to nip in the bud all constructive efforts in this direction.

The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, as a State which is an immediate neighbour of the Federal Republic of Germany, has for many years been trying to bring about the adoption of measures which would curb the appetites of the adventurers of atomic death. We believe that our aspirations reflect in equal measure the vital interests of the other peoples of Europe as well, including the people of Germany. We therefore express the hope that the Western Powers also, whether in Europe or outside Europe, will correctly understand the significance of the Soviet proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact and will help to bring it about as speedily as possible.

The same, in fact, applies to the draft declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75) which was submitted by the Soviet delegation. We consider this draft to be a very important document, the implementation of which would reduce to the greatest possible extent the danger of a nuclear war and would have a favourable result in lessening international tension between States. Hardly anything represents a greater threat to world peace than the strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons -- whether nuclear submarines, aircraft carriers or strategic missiles and bombers -- stationed in foreign territories. Their presence in various countries and territorial waters spreads foci of nuclear war throughout the world, creates an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion in international relations and may at any moment ignite the spark of a nuclear war. It creates the danger of conflicts by accident and contributes to the spreading of nuclear weapons to countries which up to now have had none.

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All these facts, as well as others, have already been convincingly demonstrated in the statements of the delegations of the socialist countries, and I therefore do not intend to repeat them. The representatives of the Western States, however, take a negative attitude towards this proposal. This cannot be regarded as an accidental phenomenon. The objections to this draft declaration which we have heard from the Western representatives are not only a defence of the existing military bases, but also an attempt to justify the extremely dangerous course recently taken by the NATO countries. The Western Powers, and first and foremost the United States, not only continue to disregard the insistent demand of the peoples for the elimination of all military bases on foreign territories, but on the contrary are trying to strengthen even further this system of bases and are taking new and very risky steps. I have in mind the gradual implementation of plans for creating a global system of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons based, in particular, on nuclear submarines with Polaris missiles, whose bases are to be sited between Iceland and Japan in an enormous ring surrounding the socialist countries. Other NATO countries in addition to the United States are to participate in the creation of this system through the so-called multilateral nuclear force. In this way the West German militarists will also be given access to nuclear weapons.

The button which could set in motion the mechanism of a destructive nuclear war is coming within the reach of more and more hands, and particularly the most dangerous of them, those reaching out from Bonn. Attempts are now being made to convince public opinion that a nuclear war cannot be started by one hand alone, that it can break out only if all hands and all fingers press this button at the same time. But such assurances can lead only to unfounded hopes and dangerous illusions. It is an incontrovertible fact that in this way access to these most destructive weapons is being given precisely to those who make no attempt to conceal their revanchist appetites and are trying to create a situation in which their allies would be compelled to start a nuclear war.

The draft declaration, of course, does not facilitate the preparations of such plans. This explains the opposition with which it has encountered from those who are against any agreement which might have a favourable influence in lessening international tension. The real reason for their opposition is not the fear that adoption of this draft declaration would weaken the defence capacity of the West

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and destroy the existing balance of power in the world, but rather the fear that the plans leading to the preparation and unleashing of a nuclear war would be upset and weakened. It has already become typical in our negotiations that every proposal submitted by the socialist delegations is attacked by the Western representatives as a manoeuvre based on the subjective interests of the socialist countries. That is why the Western representatives assess these proposals exclusively from the standpoint of military and strategic positions and disregard completely the objective political aspects. This in itself is an obviously distorted view of things.

Indeed, the problem of maintaining peace and preventing the threat of a general nuclear war is a problem of life or death for hundreds of millions of people living on both sides of the line which separates the States of the two social systems. This is important precisely from the standpoint of Europe, where a war, owing to the great density of population, would entail the most horrible consequences. Therefore the advantages of implementing measures aimed at lessening international tension would be objective and useful for all countries and nations, irrespective of the group to which they belong.

Let us take, for instance, the specific proposal to limit armaments in Central Europe, which was submitted by the Government of the Polish People's Republic (ENDC/C.1/1). I am referring to the proposal for creating a denuclearized zone. The Czechoslovak delegation has always expressed itself in favour of creating such zones in various parts of the world, whether in Central Europe, Africa or Latin America. We are convinced that the creation of such zones -- which our Conference should also help forward to a considerable extent -- would consolidate peace, strengthen confidence between States, and reduce the threat of a nuclear war. As is well known, the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic expressed its full support of the proposal of the Polish People's Republic for creating a denuclearized zone including Poland, Czechoslovakia and both German States. We shall continue in the future to hold the view that such a measure would substantially contribute to improving the situation in Central Europe. It would first of all diminish the risk of the outbreak of a nuclear war in this buffer zone between the two military groups. The reduction and weakening of tension in this area, where the interests of all the nuclear Powers come into contact, would create a favourable atmosphere for solving other important international problems.

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Despite the general recognition of the timeliness of the Polish plan for the creation of a demuclearized zone in Central Europe, the Western Powers have for more than five years been hindering any serious discussion of it. The motives for their negative attitude are now seen more clearly than ever before in the light of the preparations for arming Western Germany with nuclear weapons within the framework of NATO. The creation of a demuclearized zone is encountering opposition mainly from the West German militarists, who are feverishly seeking to obtain nuclear weapons in order to carry out their reckless plans for revenge.

Nevertheless, the idea of creating demuclearized zones is making headway. It is supported by the peoples of Europe, Africa and Latin America, and by public opinion throughout the world. The need for such a measure ~~was~~ expressed with renewed insistence by many delegations at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Under the pressure of such unanimous support for the idea of demuclearized zones, even the representatives of the Western Powers were compelled to modify their previous frankly negative position. In this connexion I should like to quote the statement of the United States representative, Mr. Dean, in the First Committee of the General Assembly on 6 November 1962. He said:

(continued in English)

"Each region of the world has its own disarmament problem.

Many of these could be solved without waiting for big Power agreement on general and complete disarmament. States in many regions of the world could negotiate disarmament or arms control agreements among themselves so that local arms races could be prevented or halted."

Mr. Dean said further:

"The United States would welcome and respect such regional arrangements, providing only that they were arrived at freely by all the parties concerned in the region". (A/C.1/PV.1267, p.56)

(continued in Russian)

My delegation trusts that the United States delegation and the delegations of the other Western Powers in our Committee will take, in regard to the proposal for the creation of a demuclearized zone in Central Europe, a position corresponding to the spirit -- I repeat, the spirit -- of that statement.

(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

Regarding the procedure of discussion, we agree that the discussion of this question should first of all relate to the general principles on which such zones would be created, and then to the obligations of the States comprising such zones, and to guarantees against violation of the status of those zones. The adoption of general principles for the creation of demuclearized zones would be the starting point for a detailed discussion of the memorandum submitted by the Polish delegation on 28 March 1962 (ENDC/C.1/1), the contents of which were recalled to us by Mr. Blusztajn.

In conclusion, I should like to express the views of our delegation regarding the United States working paper on reduction of the risk of war through accident, miscalculation or failure of communication (ENDC/70). In view of the present conditions, in which the possibility of the outbreak of war through accident has increased in an unprecedented way, we cannot doubt the need for the implementation of urgent measures to preclude completely this dangerous possibility.

My delegation considers that one such measure which would completely avert the risk of war through accident would be the renunciation of the use of force and of military armaments in solving international problems, and the implementation of general and complete disarmament. The risk of war through accident could also be reduced by adopting a number of other measures to which I referred in the earlier part of my statement. There is no need to emphasize what results would derive from the adoption, for instance, of the draft declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons, the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the Warsaw Treaty States and NATO, the creation of demuclearized zones, and so on.

However, we must note with regret that the United States working paper does not contain any measures that could really preclude or substantially reduce the possibility of war through accident. The proposed observation posts, aerial observation, the creation of mobile ground observation teams on the territories of other States, along with other measures of an exclusively control character, in a situation where a treaty on general and complete disarmament had not been concluded and implemented, would in our opinion only lead to the creation of favourable conditions for intelligence activities. Is it realistic to demand that the socialist States, surrounded by hundreds of United States bases equipped with

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nuclear weapons, should make information of a military character available, or allow inspections to be carried out on their territories, without a single measure of disarmament having been taken?

That is why my delegation fully shares the view that the proposed measures, with the exception of establishing a direct line of communication between the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States, would be of importance only if they were carried out within the framework of general and complete disarmament. Their implementation separately, in isolation from the various stages of disarmament, would be not only pointless but, I would say, even harmful, since they could be misused for the purpose of espionage and thus to the detriment of the security of other countries. Not only would they not contribute to reducing the possibility of war through accident, but they would create a deceptive feeling of security and the illusion that guarantees existed against such a danger, which meanwhile would go on getting greater.

If the delegations of the Western Powers really want to reduce the risk of war through accident, they should with greater responsibility set about discussing such measures as are really directed towards this aim. But, first of all, they must do away with the policy which is inevitably leading to a universal war of destruction, with the policy of the cold war, the policy of positions of strength, the policy of the armaments race and of stirring up enmity between the peoples. It is now for the Western Powers to take a decisive step towards eliminating the risk of nuclear war, the danger of which is fully recognized in the United States working paper.

Those are all the observations that I wished to make this morning.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): Today, in accordance with our agreed schedule, we are discussing collateral measures -- those measures concerning the armaments of States which could be undertaken prior to the initiation of a programme of general disarmament. It is, I believe, only fair to say that so far, unfortunately, our discussions have not been markedly productive. But they have not been completely barren, and that in itself is not an unimportant fact.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

We have achieved, as a result of those discussions and of governmental consideration of statements in this Committee (ENDC/PV.118, p.52), the possibility of a first concrete agreement -- that relating to the establishment of a direct communications link between the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union. We are continuing private conversations with the Soviet delegation aimed at producing a specific agreement on that subject. We shall, of course, report as appropriate on progress towards such an agreement, which we hope and expect to achieve, and my Government has already welcomed the decision of the Soviet Government to move forward in this connexion.

Beyond that limited progress, however, we have had little to encourage us. For its part, the United States delegation has given further explanation (ENDC/PV.115, pp.13 et seq; ENDC/PV.122, pp.5 et seq.) of the two additional proposals on risk-of-war measures (ENDC/70, pp.4, 8) which the United States has put forward and which are reflected also in the Soviet disarmament plan (ENDC/2/Rev.1). Thus we have spelt out further details of our proposals for the exchange of military missions and for advance notification of major military movements.

At our last meeting devoted to collateral measures, held on 19 April, the United States delegation discussed further (ENDC/PV.122, pp.5 et seq.) the proposal for the exchange of military missions, and emphasized the permissive nature of that proposed undertaking -- an arrangement that would impose no obligations but would afford to the host Government an opportunity to use the missions when it deemed them useful. We are convinced that it is what might be called a mutual-interest measure, which raises no security problems for either Government but could make a contribution in reducing the risk of war and also in increasing confidence and improving relations between the two Governments. We would hope that in further discussions on the proposal, which we are prepared to undertake either here in plenary meetings or informally, any doubts or concerns could be set at rest and that speedy progress could be made.

We have also had at our Friday meetings some discussion of other proposals; but in all honesty one cannot say that it has been such as to move us forward. Why is that so? The Soviet representative has tried to give his explanation. He has said that our failure to move forward was due to the refusal of the Western delegations to discuss Soviet proposals. Indeed, in his statement on 24 April (ENDC/PV.124, p. 11), when we were discussing general disarmament measures, Mr. Tsarapkin carried that theme of so-called Western silence to an extreme when he misused the courtesy of the Western delegations -- which were waiting to hear the responses of the Soviet delegation and

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its allied delegations to previous Western statements -- to attempt to charge that the West was not addressing itself to Soviet proposals.

We submit that Western replies at our last meeting were more than sufficient refutation of that charge as far as it concerned general disarmament measures. As to the question of Western responses to Soviet proposals on collateral measures, we submit that it would appear to any objective observer of our work that the problem is not one of any lack of Western responses to Soviet proposals, but rather a problem of the nature of the Soviet proposals themselves. For what are we supposed to be considering in our discussion of collateral measures proposals? We are supposed to be considering proposals which by their nature can be easily agreed upon before we have negotiated the more difficult and complex matters that must form the beginning of general disarmament. That means that the measures which we should be considering in this context are those measures that can, without upsetting the existing military relationship, reduce the risk of war, begin the process of halting the arms race, or initiate arms reductions.

We would say to the Soviet delegation and to its allies -- not in a polemic way and not to make debating points, but frankly and sincerely -- that we do not believe the collateral measures proposed by the Soviet delegation so far represent realistic efforts to find measures that have any prospect of leading to constructive negotiations. We have not sought to avoid discussion of Soviet proposals that relate to initial measures to halt or reduce the dangers of the arms race. The United States delegation has, of course, expressed its view (ENDC/PV.100, p.50) that one of the Soviet proposals, that concerning a non-aggression pact (ENDC/77) between the members of NATO and the members of the Warsaw Pact organization, is inappropriate for discussion in this Committee.

We are concerned in this Committee with matters relating to disarmament and to the control of armaments. We are not here seized of general political problems, and we are particularly not seized of those problems specifically related to European regional security matters. We have stated that view frankly and openly, and we would hope that the Soviet delegation would understand that fact.

With regard to the Soviet proposal which does concern armaments -- the draft declaration on nuclear delivery vehicles (ENDC/75) -- the Western delegations have clearly pointed out how lacking in potential for meaningful negotiation that proposal is. I do not say that in any spirit of hostility to any honest Soviet efforts to discern and to set forth collateral measures that might begin the disarmament process. But it does seem to my delegation that the Soviet draft declaration cannot even pretend

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to meet that standard. We would have thought that the presentation which our United Kingdom colleague, Mr. Godber, made on the subject on 29 March (ENDC/PV.115, pp.36 et seq.) would have convinced our Soviet colleagues of the one-sided nature of their proposal. Mr. Godber pointed out the consequences of that proposal -- consequences that would adversely affect only the Western Powers. He pointed out that the first operative paragraph of the Soviet proposal -- that calling for the abolition of so-called foreign bases for submarines carrying nuclear weapons -- was a demand for unilateral disengagement or redeployment by the West. We need not repeat the strategic military arguments in that connexion -- we know that the Soviet Union is quite aware of them.

Mr. Godber pointed out also how operative paragraph 2 of the Soviet declaration, concerning the withdrawal of aircraft carriers, would once again affect only the West, since the Soviet Union has not placed any part of its military strength in the form of aircraft carriers.

Similarly, Mr. Godber showed how operative paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Soviet proposal -- dealing respectively with strategic missiles with a range of over 1,500 kilometres and strategic aircraft located abroad -- would involve unilateral disarmament or redeployment by the members of NATO, while leaving Western Europe under the undisturbed and ominous threat of Soviet missiles and aircraft.

Those considerations are based on the hard reality of facts. We of the West find it difficult, if not impossible, to believe that Soviet military judgements are so different from those of the Western nations that the Soviet Union does not also draw the same conclusions. But of course that does not mean that Soviet military officials would not like to see the Soviet proposals put into effect. Of course they would. But does this lead us anywhere? Does it lead us towards constructive negotiation of meaningful first steps? That is the basic question which my delegation addresses to the Soviet delegation.

To propose measures that one's own side would like to see implemented, without consideration of the likely effect upon, or attitude of, the other side would be a very easy task. I dare say that the Soviet and, for that matter, the United States delegations could produce pages of such proposals. But that is not our task. Our task, as far as our discussion and negotiation of collateral measures is concerned, is to propose measures which will not adversely affect one side in relation to the other but which will contribute to lessening tensions and halting the arms race. I submit that we of the United States delegation have tried to do that. We believe that all the measures that we have proposed are of that type; and we have concentrated at this

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stage of our discussion on those measures proposed by us that most clearly offer mutual advantages and most clearly present minimum problems, in the hope that we might make an early beginning.

We are not children. Each side can recognize one-sided proposals. By pressing them we gain nothing and run the risk of merely convincing others that we are not serious. Our plea, therefore, is that we take a fresh look at where we stand, that we advance those proposals that we can in all honesty expect the other side to consider practical and equitable, and thus that we work together to achieve those initial steps that will move us closer to the goal of general disarmament.

Mr. LALL (India): The delegation of India wishes to exercise very briefly its right to raise matters which are not normally before us today. We should like to raise the same subject which the representative of Italy raised (supra, pp.5,6) at the beginning of this meeting.

We should like to join in expressing fervent hope for the success of the renewed efforts which are now being made at the topmost level to solve the test ban issue. Indeed, as we take into account the progress which has been made, the fact that the two positions are now very close one to another, and the fact that there has been considerable clarification of the remaining issues which are still obstacles to a test ban agreement --- and also the widely-expressed view that the remaining issues can be solved --- it is difficult for us to believe that the new effort which has been made will fail. We believe, on the contrary, that it will succeed. May we add that the level at which the initiative has been taken, and at which the response will also no doubt be given, than which there can be none higher, convinces us that the utmost degree of human responsibility for peaceful settlements is being brought to bear in making the moves which are now taking place?

We believe that that great degree of responsibility carries with it an awareness of the inescapable need to succeed in reaching a test ban agreement, and that the feelings of the world --- the demands of the world, even --- will, together with the great sense of responsibility that exists among those who are now handling the problem, bring us to a safeguarded and effective test ban agreement in the very near future.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

The Soviet delegation cannot hide its deep disappointment and alarm at the situation that exists in the Eighteen-Nation Committee in regard to all three groups of problems with which the Committee is dealing. We have to note the complete absence of progress on questions relating to the problem of general and complete disarmament, and on measures aimed at lessening international tension and facilitating general and complete disarmament. Even such a comparatively simple and uncomplicated question as the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests is still unsolved after almost five years. This question is once again in an impasse, and matters are at a standstill.

Anyone who attempted to understand the reasons for the completely unsatisfactory state of affairs in the Committee without taking into account the events taking place outside the Committee — that is, in isolation from these events — would, it can be said in advance, hardly be able to understand correctly the gist of the negotiations and the reasons why they have not led to any results. If what takes place within the Committee is compared with events outside the Committee, everything becomes absolutely clear, the true reasons for the complete stagnation in the disarmament negotiations are revealed, and ways and means of overcoming the existing impasse become clear.

Outside the Eighteen-Nation Committee the Western Powers are carrying on a frenzied arms race and are engaged in intensive military preparations which become more extensive from day to day. Military expenditures rise continually from year to year. The Western Powers are carrying out feverish organizational measures for spreading nuclear weapons among all the members of NATO under the guise of creating a so-called NATO multilateral force. The most effective ways of providing Western Germany with nuclear weapons are being devised. In the Eighteen-Nation Committee the representatives of the Western Powers carry on all sorts of evasive debates, not about disarmament but round and about the problem, as is evident from the typical statement made today by the United States representative. Outside the Committee there are meetings of Heads of Governments, journeys by responsible officials of the Western Powers, during which new war plans are worked out, militaristic contradictions or differences are smoothed over, key military posts are distributed, targets for nuclear bombardments

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are assigned, plans are settled for the training of military contingents of nuclear subdivisions on the basis of agreements for the creation of multinational and multilateral nuclear forces, and so on and so forth.

In the Eighteen-Nation Committee the Western Powers are conducting negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. These negotiations have already been going on for very nearly five years and there is no agreement. The General Assembly of the United Nations at its seventeenth session adopted another resolution insistently calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. Moreover, in its resolution 1762A (ENDC/63) the Assembly again called on the nuclear Powers to cease all nuclear weapon tests by 1 January 1963 and to reach agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests under peaceful conditions in an atmosphere that would not be shaken by the thunder of nuclear explosions.

But the Western Powers, the United States and France, responded to this humane appeal of the General Assembly with the utmost disdain and satanic arrogance. The United States has repeatedly announced to the whole world that its arsenal contains a vast quantity of nuclear weapons of the most varied types for use in the most varied conditions. Official spokesmen of the United States have declared that, militarily speaking, further nuclear weapon tests would add little or nothing to what is already at the disposal of the United States. In the light of these circumstances and these facts, the question arises why the United States, having carried out approximately 275 nuclear weapon tests before 1 January 1963, took such a step as to resume nuclear weapon tests after 1 January 1963, thereby offering a direct and gross affront to the General Assembly and, through it, to all the eighty-four States members of the United Nations who voted for the paragraph of General Assembly resolution 1762A which called for the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests from 1 January 1963.

Only one explanation can be given. The United States military, industrial and financial complex cannot permit any lessening, even to the smallest degree, of the tension in international relations, such as would, of course, be the direct result of the cessation of tests and an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. As a result of the powerful pressure of these forces, the possibility of reaching agreement to put an end to the nuclear arms race has been constantly and persistently blocked. These forces gave a new impetus to the affair of the resumption of nuclear weapon tests by the United States and France after 1 January 1963.

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When we look at the extremely unsatisfactory situation of the negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee against the background of these events and in the light of these facts, and when we compare the positions of the representatives of the Western Powers in the Committee with the militaristic actions and activities of the Western Powers outside the Committee, everything falls into place, the fog of parliamentary sophistry so readily and skilfully used by Mr. Godber in his polemics in the Committee is dispersed, and everything becomes absolutely clear; everything is explained, and the reasons why there has been no progress in regard to all three aspects of the problem become perfectly clear.

On 19 April the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, stressed that in the opinion of the United States —

"... the risk of war will not be precluded even with the beginning of disarmament, but only by completion of those disarmament measures which will remove entirely the present ominous capacities of both sides to wage war ..." (ENDC/PV.122, p.5)

What gave Mr. Stelle grounds for so readily, I would even say so joyfully, giving such a pessimistic assessment of the prospects of the struggle to eliminate the threat of a nuclear missile war which is hanging over mankind? The answer is fairly simple. It is because the United States does not even set itself such a task as the elimination of the threat of a nuclear missile war. For this reason there is no place in the proposals put forward by the United States for measures aimed at the urgent solution of this problem.

But the Soviet Union is tackling the solution of this problem, and its proposals contain effective measures aimed at solution both in the initial stage of disarmament and by means of measures outside the framework of a treaty, even before one is concluded. This is one of the important fundamental differences between the Soviet and the United States approach to the question, between the Soviet proposals and those of the United States. The Soviet proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1, art.5) for the destruction in the first stage of disarmament of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, except for a strictly limited agreed number of missiles to be retained only in the Soviet Union and the United States until the end of the second stage, is directed towards the achievement of this aim. The Soviet proposal on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75) is also directed towards the achievement of this aim, and so is the Soviet proposal for the conclusion

of a non-aggression pact between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty (ENDC/77).

These proposals of the Soviet Union are designed, either within the framework of a treaty on general and complete disarmament or outside the framework of such a treaty, that is, before its conclusion, to eliminate as quickly as possible the danger of a nuclear missile war, if not completely, at least to the extent of considerably reducing it.

The United States takes a different position in this matter of life or death for humanity. It considers, don't you see, that it is quite impossible to eliminate the threat of a nuclear missile war. Therefore, it says, it is necessary to put forward measures that are modest, moderate, realistic, balanced, measured, feasible, practical, fair, and so on and so forth. In general the Western Powers are striving, as one of our proverbs says, "to make haste slowly" in the matter of eliminating the danger of a nuclear missile war, while outside the Committee the military preparations of the Western Powers and the arms race are being continually intensified and accelerated.

In this regard we disagree altogether with the Western Powers, and we do not think that anyone will support them in this matter. We are bound to note that the position of the United States and its Western partners in regard to the proposals and measures submitted here for lessening international tension is essentially different from the position of the socialist countries. The United States and the other Western Powers have not only not accepted these, as the Soviet Union has done, but even refuse to consider and state their attitude towards the proposals of the other side. For example, they pass over in total silence the Soviet proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact, although not a single provision of this pact would prejudice the interests of any Power or of any of the parties in the negotiations. This proposal is directly aimed at the lessening of international tension. It does not envisage any alteration in the balance of forces between the NATO and Warsaw Treaty groupings of States, or the implementation of any measures that would in any way affect the defence systems of States. This proposal expresses the desire of the parties to improve the situation in the world and to lessen international tension, as it would do if accepted.

We should like to stress once again that the proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact was drafted with due regard to the statements of the President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy, and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Macmillan, on the need to improve relations between the NATO countries and the countries of the Warsaw Treaty. The Western Powers have no arguments of any weight against the conclusion of a non-aggression pact. This is the only possible explanation for their silence when the question of the pact is being discussed in the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

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The representatives of the United States, Mr. Foster (ENDC/PV.100, p.50), and Mr. Stelle (again, p.20), tell us that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact is not a suitable subject for discussion in this forum -- that is, in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. We feel bound to say that this is an extremely vague, general formula that does not explain anything to anyone. We may ask the United States why this forum is not a suitable place for discussion of the Soviet Union's proposal on the conclusion of a non-aggression pact. Is it because the non-aligned States are represented here? But this is no argument. This statement of yours explains nothing and brings no clarity into your position. Thus we are compelled to note the lack of grounds, the lack of justification for the position of the Western Powers in regard to the proposals submitted by the socialist countries on measures aimed at lessening international tension and, in particular, in regard to the proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the two military groupings.

The negative position of the Western Powers in regard to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact is incomprehensible to us. In order to elucidate the position with regard to the discussion of measures aimed at the lessening of international tension, we should like once again to ask the delegations of the United States and the other Western Powers why the proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact is unacceptable to them. Why do the Western Powers evade considering this question in the Committee? We await clear explanations from the Western Powers on this question.

Obviously, given the attitude now taken by the United States and its NATO allies in regard to disarmament and measures aimed at eliminating the danger of a nuclear missile war, mankind will find itself plunged into the abyss of a nuclear missile war before it can wait long enough for disarmament, or even for the implementation of measures aimed at reducing the danger of a nuclear war.

On 19 April Mr. Stelle warned us against "the danger of complacency". I hope that all those present noticed how Mr. Stelle, without even a smile on his face, warned us all that --

"We must not allow any initial measure of limited success" (what success?) "to lull us into a relaxation of our efforts to move on to more significant disarmament measures ..." (ENDC/PV.122, p.6)

In view of the unfavourable disposition, reluctance and extremely cautious attitude of the United States towards disarmament and towards measures aimed at eliminating the danger of a nuclear missile war, Mr. Stelle's warnings against "the danger of

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complacency", or the danger of "a relaxation of our efforts" in regard to disarmament on account of some initial success, sound like an anecdote, because there has been no success in disarmament. Apparently this is an example of Mr. Stelle's dismal humour. Actually, we are now faced with an arms race, with the growth of military preparations, but in regard to the negotiations there is complete stagnation on all questions.

However, one admission by Mr. Stelle in his statement of 19 April deserves our attention. He said that none of the initial measures, among which, in addition to the cessation of tests, he quite rightly included the measures proposed by the United States for reduction of the risk of war through accident, miscalculation or failure of communication (ENDC/70), would "... reduce the risk of war."

(ENDC/PV.122, p.6). One must say that this is an altogether sensible assessment by Mr. Stelle of the United States proposals contained in the aforesaid document, and we are in full agreement with this assessment. In fact, the proposal for advance notification of major military movements and manoeuvres, if taken in isolation from real disarmament measures, would yield nothing useful whatsoever and would certainly not eliminate the risk of war. The same can be said of the proposal for an exchange of military missions. Judge for yourselves, gentlemen, how anything good, positive and reassuring could come from an exchange of military missions in the conditions of a frenzied arms race and intensive military preparations.

Let us face the facts confirming this, which were mentioned by the United States Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara, a few days ago. Speaking at a dinner given by the American Society of Newspaper Editors on 20 April, Mr. McNamara stated that in the past twenty-four months the United States has doubled the reserves of nuclear warheads available to its strategic forces. He stated that the orders for Polaris missiles for nuclear submarines were being rapidly expanded, and that the fulfilment of these orders -- that is, their delivery -- was being speeded up. The same applied to the Minuteman, another type of solid-fuel missile. The number of B.52 strategic bombers in a state of continual combat readiness -- that is, ready to take off with a load of nuclear bombs within fifteen minutes of an order being given -- had increased by 50 per cent. The United States Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara, also stated that in the last twelve months alone the quantity of nuclear weapons in Europe at the disposal of NATO had increased by 60 per cent.

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If we add to this the feverish measures of the Western Powers to create multi-lateral and multinational NATO nuclear forces, which means extending nuclear weapons to the armed forces of other States forming part of NATO and, above all, to the West German Bundeswehr, whose aggressive revanchist aspirations are well known, and if we also add the transfer of United States atomic submarines with Polaris missiles to the Mediterranean, to an area in the immediate vicinity of the southern frontiers of the Soviet Union and other socialist States of Europe, we are faced with the picture of a world completely saturated with explosives.

That is where are hidden, Mr. Stelle, enormous -- I would say inexhaustible -- possibilities of a nuclear war breaking out by accident. No measures for the exchange of military missions or for advance notification of major military movements and manoeuvres will eliminate this danger. The danger of nuclear war increases every day, and will continue to increase, if events are allowed to develop in the direction in which they are developing at present. The arms race and the intensification of military preparations continue unceasingly and create war-danger spots in various places. Only measures such as those proposed by the Soviet Union will eliminate such danger spots and avert the risk of war whether planned or accidental. Such measures are a declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons, the conclusion of a non-aggression pact, and the creation of denuclearized zones.

In view of the intensive, clearly-provocative preparations of the western Powers, which do not conceal that all these preparations are aimed against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, judge for yourselves, gentlemen, what sense there can be in an exchange of military missions or information. Undoubtedly this exchange of military missions outside the framework of disarmament would in no way reduce the risk of the outbreak of war but, on the contrary, might contribute to such a dangerous development of events, since it could easily become a means for collecting reconnaissance information on the defence of a peaceful country marked in the plans of the other side as an object for attack, and so on.

I repeat once again that only the measures proposed by the Soviet Union which I mentioned earlier are of really substantial importance for lessening considerably the danger of war. We insist on the adoption of those measures. We cannot agree with the fatalistic approach to this problem shown by the representatives of the Western Powers,

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who base themselves on the assumption that the threat of war must remain for many, many years, apparently -- if I have understood them correctly -- up to the very last stage of disarmament.

This fatalistic approach, if one accepted and agreed to it, would entail recognition of the necessity of the arms race, the continuation of intensive military preparations, and further increase of military expenditures. It is clear to us who has prompted this fatalistic approach. The source is the same: it is the United States military-industrial and financial complex, the all-powerful military-industrial corporations, companies and trusts which, together with the big banks of the United States, form a powerful financial oligarchy in the country, closely linked by visible and invisible ties with the Administration. This oligarchy imposes its will in the framing of domestic and foreign policy, hinders progress in the disarmament negotiations and blocks agreement even on such a comparatively simple question as the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. That is the gist of the matter.

That is why the disarmament negotiations have been turned into an empty farce, a comedy, a senseless repetition of futilities. No talk of a balanced approach to disarmament, of a balance of forces, of gradual equal disarmament, with a percentage approach in some cases and without it in other cases, depending on what is advantageous to the Western Powers, will enable them to conceal their actual sabotage of the cause of disarmament all along the line: in the working out of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, in the devising of measures aimed at lessening international tension and reducing the danger of war, and in working out an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

The Western Powers have adopted an absolutely wrong approach to the solution of questions aimed at reducing the risk of war through accident, miscalculation or failure of communication. The United States proposals on these questions, as Mr. Stelle openly admitted on 19 April, are not

"... intended to afford a guarantee against surprise attack ..."

The United States proposals, as Mr. Stelle explained, are intended

"... rather to reduce the danger of misunderstanding." (ENDC/PV.122, p.7)

Or, as he further explained, to deter the other side from taking counter-measures. This is an interesting admission, from which it follows that a situation is possible in which, for example, party "A" might undertake actions which are evaluated by another

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party "B" as threatening its security and as a military demonstration against it; but party "A" could make use of the machinery or procedure proposed by the United States to prevent any counter measures on the part of party "B".

It seems to us so obvious as to need no proof that the gist of the matter at present lies not in reducing the danger of misunderstanding, as Mr. Stelle has said, but in something far more serious: war by accident, like war that is not by accident, can only be averted by eliminating the causes and not the consequences. It is necessary to destroy the nutrient medium in which dangerous situations of an accidental or intentional nature arise daily and will inevitably continue to arise. This nutrient medium is created by the arms race and the growth of military preparations. If these are ended, the risk of war by accident will also disappear.

Let us take an example from real life. Since the beginning of April United States nuclear submarines have appeared in the Mediterranean. Each of these submarines carries 16 Polaris missiles with nuclear warheads. What does this fact mean for the political life of Europe and the Near East? It means that the States of southern and south-eastern Europe, North Africa and the Near East bordering on the Mediterranean are now threatened day and night by these United States submarines that have penetrated into the Mediterranean, into regions that are seven to eight thousand kilometres from the shores of the United States. From the Mediterranean these submarines are within easy reach of the Black Sea.

The very fact of the appearance of these submarines near the southern shores of the Soviet Union and of other socialist States in Europe is undoubtedly a provocative act that threatens the security of the Soviet Union and the socialist States. At the same time, Mr. Cavalletti, these submarines create a terrible danger for the countries forming part of NATO, along whose shores they cruise or in whose waters they are based. We have warned on several occasions that in the event of a crisis a devastating nuclear blow will be dealt not only at fixed missile installations and launching sites, but also at roving nuclear submarines with Polaris missiles on board, wherever they may be.

Against the background of such provocative acts as the despatch of United States nuclear submarines with Polaris missiles to the Mediterranean -- that is, to a region from which it is easy to threaten the southern boundaries of the Soviet Union and the socialist States of Europe -- what hypocrisy one needs to have in order to hold forth with a straight face in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on the usefulness of advance notification of military movements!

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The falsity of the proposals and statements of the United States representatives is obvious from the example of nuclear submarines equipped with Polaris missiles. Supposing we were to accept the United States proposal for advance notification of the movement of troops and ships, manoeuvres and so on; would the United States give exact information on the location of these submarines at any given moment? It is well known that United States strategists consider the greatest advantage of these submarines to be their ability to cruise secretly while submerged for many weeks and even months without surfacing, and thus to delivery a surprise nuclear blow. Their underwater movements can only be traced by special means involving special equipment. Consequently advance notification is not always envisaged in the United States proposal, and in those cases where it is envisaged it does not do away with the risk of war by accident.

But what about a war that is not by accident, a war that is premeditated? What about the war that is now being planned and worked out in all its details and is being prepared by the national general staffs of the Western Powers and by the general staff of NATO? This war, apparently, does not bother the United States. Let it be prepared, let it occur, so long as we do not allow war through accident, miscalculation, error or failure of communication. What strange, incomprehensible logic! We cannot accept or agree with it.

We consider that the implementation of the Soviet proposals -- that is, the adoption of a declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons, the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, and the creation of denuclearized zones in the most dangerous parts of the world -- would lead to a real relaxation of international tension, to a serious improvement in relations between States, and thereby to reduction of the risk of war, including war through accident, miscalculation or failure of communication.

In our previous statements on this question we have already drawn the attention of the members of the Committee to the value and great effectiveness of the Soviet proposals from the point of view of precluding the possibility of war through accident, and we have put forward appropriate arguments in confirmation. These arguments have not been refuted by the Western delegations. Indeed, who can dispute that the implementation of such measures as renunciation of the use of foreign territories for

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stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons, the conclusion of a non-aggression pact, and the creation of denuclearized zones would create a quite different situation in the world? The implementation of these measures would really create a situation of trust and mutual understanding in international relations, and this would undoubtedly lead to a considerable reduction of the threat of war until it completely disappeared at the end of the implementation of general and complete disarmament.

This disarmament, given good will on the part of the Western Powers, could be achieved, thus eliminating once and for all the danger of any war, including war through accident or miscalculation. We request the Western Powers to think over every aspect of the situation that has arisen and to engage at last in what they speak about so often in their statements: real negotiations on real disarmament measures, and on measures that will help to reduce the threat of a nuclear missile war. We request the Western Powers to cease manoeuvring for the purpose of avoiding disarmament, of avoiding measures that would help towards lessening international tension and reducing the threat of a nuclear missile war, and to set about the work in the proper way.

Sir Paul MASON (United Kingdom): I had not intended to speak this morning, and I shall delay the Committee for only a few minutes to advance one or two quite simple arguments. I judge it to be the feeling of the Committee today that, though the discussion this morning has ranged fairly wide, it should not be unnecessarily polemical. I say that having in mind particularly the observations made by our colleagues from Italy and India. Nevertheless, I want first of all to take up one point which was made quite shortly and clearly by our colleague from Czechoslovakia, and which has been inherent right through the longer, and I am bound to say more controversial, statement to which we have just listened from our Soviet colleague.

Our Czechoslovak colleague said, if I understood him correctly, that the Western members of this Conference were open to a charge of over-utilization of the argument that there is a lack of trust between nations in present conditions. He went on to say that on that over-utilized argument the West was apt to characterize radical measures as "unwise, unrealistic and even unfeasible" (supra, p. 7). I should just like, in the light of that, to look at the way in which both our Czechoslovak and our Soviet colleagues dealt this morning with the proposals on collateral measures which have been submitted to the Conference by the United States (ENDC/70).

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When commenting on those proposals our Czechoslovak colleague -- and here again he was echoed by Mr. Tsarapkin (supra, p.28) -- first of all took the line that measures such as the United States proposes would be useful only in a context of general and complete disarmament (supra, p.17). In other words he implied -- and this was more explicitly stated by Mr. Tsarapkin (supra, p.30) -- that they were of no use because they were in some way an attempt to shelve or postpone the question of reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament itself.

Of course, it is quite clear, and it has been stated explicitly by our United States colleague (ENDC/FV.122, p.6), that those proposals are in no sense of the word competing with the conception of general and complete disarmament. In fact, no proposals concerning collateral measures do that. They are merely steps which we try to take because we have not yet succeeded in progressing very far along the road of general disarmament, and we wish in the meantime to limit the risk of war breaking out. So on that ground I do not think that the criticism is very well founded.

Our Czechoslovak colleague (supra, p.17), and again our Soviet colleague (supra, p.29) went on to use another argument when they suggested that the proposals themselves were not desirable because they were concerned simply to promote the purpose of espionage by the Western countries. The United States representative stated in very clear terms at our last meeting on this subject (ENDC/FV 122, p.8), and again today (supra, p.19), that the whole idea of the exchange of missions and so forth was that they should take place on an entirely permissive basis. He stressed the importance of such measures being of value not to the country which was going to introduce the missions -- though no doubt they would be, for the purpose of eliminating misunderstandings -- but to the host country itself. To characterize ideas of that kind as seeking to promote the purposes of espionage is to my mind to give the most obvious proof one could require that the lack of trust is not on the Western side but is on the side of the Eastern countries themselves. Therefore I hope we shall not be accused of over-utilizing the argument that there is in fact a lack of trust in the world as a whole. It is, of course, something which we all deeply regret, but we have to face the fact that it does exist.

In parallel with that I want to develop another point which our Soviet colleague has made today (supra, p.32), and also on previous occasions, namely, that the Western Powers are more concerned with removing the risk of war breaking out by

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

accident and miscalculation than with the actual possibility of aggression itself. It is frequently bandied about in this Committee that one side or the other -- and again I have to say how much I regret that we do have to talk about "one side or the other" -- has specifically aggressive intentions. But that is not the basis on which this Conference is proceeding or ought to proceed.

We know that in fact there is, as I say, a lack of trust in this world, and we know that while lack of trust ~~persists~~ the various nations of the world are going to take steps, and are in fact taking steps, to secure their defence. It is not necessary, or to my mind correct, to argue that that involves aggressive intentions. We have heard again this morning from our Soviet colleague a long series of quotations from Western spokesmen, such as Mr. McNamara, and I could -- and, if I were provoked, I would -- parallel them with a long series of statements by Soviet spokesmen, such as Marshal Malinovsky, which would read, to my mind, as if it were a series of aggressive statements. But in fact there is no reason to suppose that those statements are meant aggressively. We must suppose that they are really statements of position; and they are statements of position which obtain in a world which is not perfect, where disarmament negotiation has not yet achieved what we hope it will achieve, and where nations therefore have to look to their own defences.

In that connexion we have to think about how those nations are going to achieve their aims. Here we again come to a proposition which is so often disputed in this Committee by the Eastern side, and that is the question of balance. Our Polish colleague, for instance, often takes it very much amiss when my leader and I talk about examining propositions which are put before this Committee from the point of view of balance: and, to be quite honest, I am becoming a little tired of his continual attempts to suggest that when we do that we are thinking in terms of what he talks about as the balance of forces -- in connexion with which he produces statements by distinguished statesmen like the late Mr. Dulles (ENDC/FV.124, p.5), and so on, to indicate that such a balance is not feasible.

On that point I need only refer him to the words Mr. Godber used at our last meeting (ENDC/FV.124, p.22), when he said quite clearly that it was not a question of drawing up a balance of forces at this stage, and that if such a balance could be drawn up it would only be in the later stages of disarmament. But what we are talking about is precisely what Mr. Blusztajn accepts as a reasonable proposition: that is, the balance of security; and the balance of security, in my submission, must be inherent in any proposition with which any country here is asked to agree. It is on that basis that we have to look at the proposals submitted to the Conference -- but directed especially at the Western Powers -- by our Eastern colleagues.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

Those proposals, I must repeat respectfully, are not always characterized by due regard for the principle of the balance of security. I need only refer again -- I do not like having to do so, but I have to from time to time -- to the situation in which the West would be left under the proposals made by the Soviet delegation if all United States forces, and especially all United States missile forces, were withdrawn from Europe, and the vast range of Soviet missile forces remained intact on Soviet territory directed at the heart of Western Europe. All this arguing is inherent, as I say, in the question of the building up of forces at a time when there is no disarmament.

It is taken very much amiss when the West, under agreements freely reached between allies, stations certain forces on certain other member States' territories. It is not, so far as I know, taken so much amiss on the Eastern side when a very considerable number of Soviet divisions is stationed on the territory of the so-called Democratic Republic of Germany, a territory which is no more threatened by anybody than any other territory in Europe as far as I know; at least, I hope it is not.

Therefore, when we are accused of arguing too much on the basis that there is a lack of trust in this world we cannot, I think, be fairly accused of suggesting that our proposals are put forward as a substitute for general and complete disarmament. I think we must reasonably be allowed to reject the contention that they are put forward for purposes of espionage, because that, as I say, turns the argument back against our Eastern colleagues.

What, then, are we left with as an argument for refusing to consider the proposals put forward by the United States? Mr. Tsarapkin gave it to us in a nutshell. He said, "Too little".

We should all like to reach agreement, if we could, on major questions without difficulty. But this Committee, as our United States colleague has said, is a Committee of responsible delegations representing responsible States; and we know that in any negotiation it is only possible to proceed by beginning with small questions -- small questions which are, I submit, urgent. I do not see that there is anything in that argument to prevent us from trying to examine the proposals to see whether they would produce the effects which it is claimed they would. The fact that they are modest proposals -- which they are -- to my mind is no objection whatever. Does any member of this Conference suppose that we should not be glad if we could make progress on even small points such as we are beginning to make -- and I thankfully record it again -- on one of the proposals already contained in the United States series of proposals?

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

If that is acceptable, why can we not make progress on other proposals which may be equally modest but which, in my view, have constructive possibilities, not for avoiding a threat of war which is expressed and determined and deliberate -- because it is not part of our task at this Conference to make any such supposition -- but for preventing the risk of something which might happen because we are not yet able to make sufficient progress on our general disarmament plans, and which, therefore, it is our duty to try to guard against as far as we can in the meantime?

Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland): I should like to deal briefly with one or two points in the statement we have just heard from our United Kingdom colleague.

I accept with some degree of satisfaction the fact that Sir Paul Mason has renounced his concept of balance of forces in favour of the concept of balance of security which I think is likely to carry us much further. However, if that is so, I wonder why he cannot accept the proposal (ENDC/77) for the conclusion of a non aggression pact. It seems to me that the conclusion of such a pact between the Warsaw Pact countries and the NATO countries could only enhance the security and the balance of security of all parties concerned.

The representative of the United Kingdom mentioned also certain aspects directly related to the proposal (ENDC/C.1/1) submitted to this Conference by the delegation of Poland for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in central Europe. Sir Paul Mason seems much concerned because there are Soviet divisions stationed in the German Democratic Republic. I am sure that he has read our proposal carefully, and knows that it not only addresses itself to the problem of the removal of nuclear weapons, but also contains provisions for a reduction of the conventional forces on the territories of the German Democratic Republic, the German Federal Republic, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. I think that if he examines the Rapacki plan more carefully he will understand that we are trying to take care of the problems with which he seems to be so concerned.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and twenty-fifth plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Lij Mikael Imru, representative of Ethiopia.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Italy, Czechoslovakia, the United States, India, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and Poland.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Monday, 29 April 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.

